I
P
in Mass Systems of Higher Education
[Next Chapter] [Previous Chapter] [Contents]
|
E I P |
2: Challenges for Management and
Planning in Mass Systems of Higher Education [Next Chapter] [Previous Chapter] [Contents] |
Approaches to Expansion: Policies and Debates
The Public Sector Reform Agenda and Higher Education
State Control and Supervision Models of Higher Education
Performance and Accountability of the Higher Education Sector
The Quality Assurance Movement
Management of Change: Collegial vs Corporate Models
The transition from 'elite' to mass systems of higher education was an international phenomenon which occurred in many industrialised countries in the post World War II period. The transition was brought about by a combination of demographic, social and economic pressures and the phenomenon is generally conceptualised in terms of the proportion of the relevant age cohort in higher education institutions. Below 15 per cent is considered to typify 'elite' higher education, between 15 and 35 per cent 'mass' systems and over 35 per cent 'universal' access. (cf. Trow 1974; DEET and OECD 1993).
Pressures for growth in higher education in the post-war period were driven in particular by: the 'baby boom'; the pipe-line effect of more students in the system and higher retention rates; the change in social expectations and attitudes regarding higher education access and participation; and the demand for qualified manpower by industry. Thus, in contrast to the small number of 'elite', largely autonomous institutions which were essentially peripheral to national concerns that existed up until the mid-1940s, the mass systems that developed in the post war period were characterised by:
In relation to the expanded goal structure of higher education, mass systems are expected:
(Cerych et al. 1974: 23)
The higher education systems of today are thus complex, multi-faceted and constantly changing and as such represent major challenges for policy makers everywhere. Indeed, the substantially increased set of goals and related responsibilities have, not surprisingly, given rise to a number of critical areas of tension. Tensions have developed:
between the requirements of excellence and of egalitarianism; between the structure and size of individual demand for higher education and of labour market requirements; between the aspirations and interests of the different groups involved in higher education; and between the aspirations and expectations of individuals and the prevailing socio-economic constraints in terms of availability of resources, academic attitudes, institutional hierarchies, established cultural and social value structures striving for self-perpetuation.
(Cerych et al. 1974: 23-24; cf Goedegeburre et al. 1993)
The reconciliation of such conflicts, which are not destructive per sé, has been recognised as a key challenge in the transition from elite to mass higher education systems and has led to ongoing debate regarding the best forms of management, planning and coordination at both the system and the individual institution level.
In discerning the key issues and trends regarding higher education policies and debates in industrialised countries in the post World War II period, Teichler (1992) uses a 3 phase chronology. The first phase identified by Teichler is from the latter part of the 1950s to the early 1960s. During this phase, higher education policy-makers were preoccupied with questions of expansion of the higher education system to meet heightened individual and social expectations/demands regarding participation and also to further economic prosperity which was considered dependent on such expansion. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s a second phase was identified.
Attention now shifted to the concern of how best to establish diversity within higher education to meet the varying backgrounds, motives and career aspirations of those entering the system. Increased allocation of resources and a heightened role by governments regarding higher education were additional features of this period. The remainder of the 1970s constitutes Teichler's third phase and saw a levelling off or decline in many countries of enrolment rates and financial support for higher education. The claimed advantages of an expanded higher education system, particularly in terms of increasing opportunities for traditionally disadvantaged groups and enhancing national economic competitiveness, were challenged (Teichler 1992: 43). Based on a view that expansion in higher education was 'both irreversible and less beneficial than previously assumed', Teichler argues that the 1970s also saw governments look for more realistic aims and policies. The growing demand for non-academic, vocational, post-secondary education during this period contrasted starkly with the low growth in higher education systems throughout the world.
During the 1980s, there was a marked diversification in the higher education policies between countries. According to Teichler, there was no single topic dominating the higher education debates, although several issues did have particular prominence in a number of countries. These issues included:
The demise of the influence of buffer bodies such as the University Grants Committee in Britain, and the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission in Australia also characterised this period and raised concern from within the academic community in particular about the autonomy of higher education institutions.
Two models that have received substantial attention in debates about structural changes in higher education are the 'diversified' and the 'integrated' models. According to Teichler (1988: 97-98):
Whereas proponents of the former model are in favour of quite distinct educational provisions in a not clearly segmented system, but rather in a system of blurred boundaries and overlapping clienteles, advocates of the latter want to limit differences in educational provision through individual units in higher education serving relatively heterogeneous student bodies.
Those who favour diversification argue that:
(cf Stadtman 1980; Cerych et al. 1974: 35)
Diversification has been a popular response of those who have had to deal with the problems faced by mass higher education systems. However, the extent to which the presumed benefits of diversity are achieved in reality still remains to be established. Diversity is discussed in more detail in relation to the Australian higher education system in the following chapter.
Teichler's chronology can be extended to reflect a fourth period regarding higher education policies and debates. For more than a decade government, the corporate sector and some institutional leaders have drawn attention to perceived inefficiencies in higher education management. Indeed the structural changes implemented regarding the Australian higher education sector in the late 1980s can be seen as a reflection of a broad, underlying dissatisfaction with this sector's performance.
The early 1990s, as a fourth phase in higher education planning and policy development, is characterised by: reductions in public expenditure; increased emphasis on efficiency of resource utilisation and management; and a strengthening of the policy and planning role of individual institutions (Teichler 1992: 44). Higher education institutions must now as Kogan (1992: 63) observes justify their existence more in economic rather than social terms:
At the time of the first expansion of higher education there were a series of uncluttered a priori upon which to work. Higher education was a good thing; good for the economy, good for society, good for the growth of knowledge and good for individual development. The associated assumption was that there was a serendipitous convergence between what the academics thought to be good academic work and what society needed....
Since then the more optimistic and serendipitous thinking has all but vanished. There is not thought to be an unbreakable link between academic advance and social good. The academics no longer fashion the objectives of higher education without interference but instead must pay heed to what is thought by political masters to be directly useful to the economy, either in research, scholarship and applied research or in skills that might be transferred from higher education to the world of employment.
Similarly, Berdahl (1991: 50) observes that in Western Europe, current government intervention in higher education reflects economic needs rather than the social demands of the previous decades, and this shift has direct consequences for institutional management. According to Berdahl 'three concerns drove this intervention: a shift from policies determined primarily by social demand to policies that are expenditure driven; strong pressures for greater efficiency in internal management; and the rise of what Neave has coined the "evaluative state"'.
The continuing pressures for rapid expansion in student enrolments and for higher education institutions to serve a greater range of functions increases the need for higher education systems to improve their capacity for effective planning and for efficient management of resources, both financial and human. In all countries, resources are limited and so it is important to devise mechanisms to ensure that these fixed resources are used to secure the greatest benefit. Management and planning are simply devices to provide a sense of direction to overall policy and development efforts, and to ensure that an effective combination is made between specified goals, social needs, available resources, and higher education expertise (Meek and Harman 1991: 83). However, as Moore and Langnecht (1986: 5) observed a decade ago:
managing the politics of reallocation and renewal during economic adversity will be one of the planners most important challenges...planners will need to learn how to plan and manage under conditions of economic adversity and intense political action. Most planners know a great deal about planning for growth, but few know how to plan under steady-state or declining economic conditions.
System-level planning in higher education has proved to be a difficult endeavour. As a result, there is now far less enthusiasm for large scale long-term planning efforts than there was in the 1960s, particularly among economists. The general view today is that effective planning has to be flexible enough to deal with unexpected internal social and political developments, and with the economic fluctuations that have plagued most national economies since the first oil price shocks of the early 1970s. It also has to be flexible enough to cope with unexpected changes in public attitudes, and with the effects of rapid technological changes. But on the other hand, it needs to be sufficiently specific so that the plan has sufficient detail to allow implementation (Meek and Harman 1991). Concern with higher education reform is thus part of a broader government agenda of micro-economic reform of the public sector and similarly, the changes proposed are framed in the language of 'efficiency' and 'productivity'. However, in questioning the role and relevance of their respective higher education systems governments are clearly expressing dissatisfaction with past quality of service and value for money.
The drive to make public sector institutions more cost efficient and internationally competitive is evident in many OECD countries. In relation to Australia, the realities of global competition was certainly recognised in a recent report on infrastructure service industries, such as electricity supply, rail freight and telecommunications:
As Australia's trade industries become more exposed to the pressures of international competition there is an increasing need for infrastructure services to be supplied on an internationally competitive basis. Many of these services are not subject to normal market forces. In the absence of such forces, performance benchmarks can be used to promote improvements in performance.
(Bureau of Industry Economics 1994: vii)
With respect to the public sector, privatisation is as much an ideological as an economic concern. Market competition 'is posed as the solution to good government, the condition for a healthy economy, and the chance for a better education' (Perkins 1987: 1). 'Privatisation' (taken here to mean the growth of 'privateness' within public higher education) and market-like competition have arisen on the higher education agenda of many countries, whether primarily public or with dual public/private sectors. As Levy (1991: 7) notes, 'privateness is ... seen as providing more incentives for efficiencies for actors from students to administrators'.
The higher education reform agenda in Australia and elsewhere is much influenced by the economic rationalists where market competition and consumer control replace strong government regulatory frameworks. Mahony's (1994a: 74) observation regarding higher education in Australia and the United Kingdom is a good illustration of this point:
The end of the binary system occurred, in both countries, during a new era in higher education when government policies influenced the day to day life of the institutions in an unprecedented manner. This arose from official convictions that the higher education institutions could contribute more directly to economic revival, do this more efficiently and effectively, be more competitive and less financially dependant upon government and build more productive links with the private and public sectors.
However, with respect to higher education, more is at stake than the efficient management of resources. Higher education occurs in a context much influenced by changing economic patterns and, as what Daniel Bell has called 'knowledge workers' begin to replace factory workers, both government and industry interest in higher education will continue to increase (cf. Perkin 1991: 199). In the market-driven agenda for higher education, knowledge itself becomes a commodity; and at the root of many concerns over how higher education institutions are run is the 'proper' management of this commodity.
In one sense, creating and managing knowledge has always been the fundamental activity of higher education institutions. Throughout history, civilisations have developed various forms of advanced training for their ruling priestly, military and bureaucratic elites, 'but only in medieval Europe did an institution recognisable as a university arise: a school of higher learning combining teaching and scholarship and characterised by its corporate autonomy and academic freedom' (Perkin 1991: 169). According to Clark (1983: 20), it is knowledge production and dissemination that provides higher education with its unique characteristics:
The factory floor in higher education is cluttered with bundles of knowledge that are attended by professionals. The professionals push and pull on their respective bundles. If they are doing research, they are trying to increase the size of the bundle and even to reconstitute it. If engaged in scholarship other than research, they are conserving, criticising, and reworking it. If teaching, they are trying to pass some of it on to the flow-through clientele we call students, encouraging them to think about its nature, how it may be used, and perhaps take up a career devoted to it.
But while knowledge production remains fundamental to higher education there is growing concern about the effectiveness of its management. Increased demand for participation; demands for greater articulation between higher and other education sectors; labour market priorities; aging populations; changes in the structure of the 'welfare state'; and the interests of minority groups are a number of factors driving this concern. Inevitably as participation rates increase (both numerically and in terms of a variety of different clientele groups) higher education becomes much more of a 'political issue'. Strong institutional management is seen as essential in the overall planning process for more relevant and cost effective higher education systems.
Higher education institutions have never been left entirely to their own devices with respect to their core activities of teaching, research and community service. Indeed, as the Teichler analysis outlined above demonstrates, one of the major policy challenges for governments in many western countries in managing their higher education systems has been how best to obtain the appropriate balance between the needs of centralised funding, planning, coordination and accountability on the one hand; and the need for institutional autonomy and appropriate discretion in goal setting and management on the other.
Since the 1970s two broad policy strategies are evident in relation to higher education. The first can be characterised as strong government planning and control through the application of 'stringent regulations' and tightened budget allocations. The second policy strategy can be seen more as a 'stepping back' by governments from detailed centralised control through encouraging higher education institutions to be more autonomous, self-regulating and market orientated in their operations-albeit within an overall framework of government priorities (Kogan 1988: 5-15; Kells 1989: 299-309; Neave 1987: 121-122; van Vught 1989: 249-270; Jappinen 1989: 333-336). The claimed advantage of this second, self-regulation strategy is that institutions are able to:
obtain an autonomy relative to central government, but at the same time be forced to go into the market in which they must seek sponsorship. They have the freedom to compete for funds. This enlargement of institutional autonomy is assumed to result in a better adjustment to changing societal conditions but at the same time, governments still have to protect the interests of the 'consumers' (i.e. students) and formulate the 'overall targets' of the higher education system.
(Askling 1989: 293)
Self-regulatory higher education systems are also considered to be more innovative than those subject to detailed centralised control (van Vught 1989; Cerych and Sabatier 1986).
Neave (forthcoming 1996) notes that the traditional Continental European model of higher education coordination, based on the principles of the normalising state and legal homogeneity, served its purpose of ensuring equity and equality of higher education provision, at least in part. But the model's central tenet of legal homogeneity has made it difficult to achieve large scale change, because change had to be equally and systematically spread across the entire system. This is one reason why many European countries have been involved with deregulation of higher education where legal homogeneity has given way to performance conditionality. Under the new so-called state supervisory model (see van Vught 1989; Neave and van Vught 1991), institutions are given more freedom to set their own mission, objectives and strategic plans. At the same time, institutions are held more accountable for use of their new freedom through such ex post devices as performance indicators, quality audits, and cost efficiency measures.
As mentioned above, an expectation of deregulation has been that it would provide institutions with more stimulus to innovate and diversify and find a particular niche in a more competitive higher education market. But Neave questions whether transferring more regulatory control from the centre to the institutions 'changes greatly the balance of power between the forces for convergence or for diversity'. Posteriori methods of control and quality assurance mechanisms apply minimal performance conditions across the system, and, at least potentially, may be as powerful forces for uniformity as centralised state control, particularly when they bring reward or punishment in their train (Meek et al. forthcoming).
Although there have always been some measures of performance of higher education institutions, up until the late 1970s few countries were interested in the systematic collection and application of performance data. However, throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, 'objective' measurement of performance and the development of indicators for this purpose became an important feature of many higher education systems. The heightened interest in performance measurement is due to many factors, most noticeably the desire by institutions to implement more effective strategic planning mechanisms and demands by governments for greater efficiency and effectiveness on the one hand, and enhancement of demonstrable public accountability on the other.
The use and abuse of performance measurement in higher education have attracted much attention in the professional literature (see, for example, Cave, Hanney and Kogan 1991; Goedegebuure, Maassen and Westerijden 1990; Johnes and Taylor 1990; Johnes 1988; Sizer 1992; Stolte-Heiskanen 1992; Pollitt 1990; Kells 1990, 1992, 1993; Linke 1992; Doyle 1995; Yorke 1995). However, while some commentators appear to imply that the application of performance measures to higher education is increasingly becoming an 'exact science' with its own specific definitions and methodologies, others strongly disagree (for example, cf. Ashworth and Harvey 1994 and Cave, Hanney and Kogan 1991; or Pollitt 1987 and Sizer 1988).
Performance measures are often used for one of three purposes: improvement, planning or accountability. The three purposes are not mutually exclusive, but they are driven by different forces. Improvement and planning are usually questions of concern to individual institutions (Findlay 1990: 125). Questions of accountability, however, are raised mainly by governments, which in turn places the use of performance measures squarely in the political arena, sponsoring wide-ranging debate and sometimes vehement criticism. Kells (1993: 5) notes that to some, performance data merely 'represent an integral part of modern management; needed by governments to monitor programs on issues of national concern if not policy; and by institutions seeking to make informed choices and progress on reaching stated intentions'. But to others, 'they represent a reductionist attempt often by government to make, usually erroneously, choices about the funding of institutions or in other ways to compare and to cull rather than to improve institutions and programmes'.
According to Findlay (1990), 'the mounting pressures for greater accountability, greater value for money, and latterly for evidence of quality of delivery, have converged with the broad debate about the definition of performance indicators'. Moreover, the continued interest in performance measurement has been mainly government driven (Kells 1993; Yorke 1995) rather than by the higher education sector itself.
Doyle (1995: 44) notes that 'the measurement of organisational performance has always been a critical concern of the business sector and to a lesser extent the service sector, but has only been of significant concern to higher education since the 1960s'. Drawing on Kells (1993) international review of performance measures, Doyle maintains that their use in higher education can be seen in terms of distinct phases. By the late 1960s, institutions were interested in performance as a 'means for allocating resources and making program choices'. Governmental interest in performance measurement as a mechanism for aiding funding decisions and monitoring achievement of national priorities did not occur until the early 1980s. During the 1980s:
interest in performance measurement in higher education shifted from a focus on quantitative measures (indicators) to increasing interest in qualitative measures combined with more limited use of quantitative indicators. This shift coincided with the emerging deregulation of the sector and decentralisation of control, the development of planning initiatives and the application of global budgets. Often referred to as the era of new managerialism in higher education, this period also marked the influence of increased executive leadership, characterised by greater managerial focus and the requirement by institutions for enhanced management information.
(Doyle 1995: 45)
It is likely that emphasis on quality assurance; government interest in monitoring performance against national goals; and a focus on institutional management with 'arms-length' control by governments will continue.
Cave, Kogan and Hanney (1990: 48) maintain that 'one important way of conceptualising performance indicators is as a public sector surrogate for the information generated elsewhere by the market system. In a competitive market prices are assumed to reflect users' valuations of output (the index of effectiveness), while the profitability of a business reflects its efficiency'. The problem with this approach for public sector institutions, such as higher education, is as the authors go on to note 'the absence of market valuations of output. In some contexts, explicit valuations can be imposed or inferred, and a full cost-benefit analysis can proceed. But generally this is not possible; output can be measured but not valued; more commonly it can only be measured indirectly'.
Whether performance measurement should be based on inputs, process or outputs has been the subject of much debate in recent years. While the debate has yet to be resolved categorically, there is a definite trend in most OECD countries towards emphasising process and outcomes. This can be seen as part of a general shift in the coordination of higher education in many countries, where governments are at once stepping back from the direct steering of higher education and demanding more rigorous and transparent public accountability of higher education (Bormans et al. 1987).
There is fairly clear agreement in the literature that performance can only be measured against clearly specified institutional goals. 'The performance of any industry, service or programme cannot be measured unless clear objectives have been set' (Jowett and Rothwell 1988: xv). But this is one factor that often makes the use of performance data in higher education controversial-often institutional goals and objectives are under dispute, not clearly defined or so general that they do not lend themselves to measurement. Allen (1988: 98-104) identifies some 73 possible goals for universities in the United Kingdom. Moreover, to paraphrase Jowett and Rothwell (1988: 3), definition of performance is largely dependent on the perspective of the interested party-whether that be academics, students, institutions, government, etc. '[I]f definitions of performance are 'interest-related', then there can be no unique measure by which the level of this performance can be gauged accurately ... The appropriateness of the chosen indicator will depend directly upon the definition adopted' (1988: 3-4). Where definitions are at odds with what the majority of staff perceive to be the essential function of the institution, the exercise is most often doomed to failure.
There is no one clear trend in the literature on how best to use performance data in higher education. However, there is some consensus that such data are of limited value, must be approached with caution and are effective only when set against the achievement of pre-specified institutional goals. There appears to be a move away from relying on numerical indicators of performance, towards more qualitative methods of assessing achievement. Also, there is a good deal of agreement that performance indicators are just that-indicators which can only be properly interpreted by groups responsible for the achievement of institutional mission and goals. Nonetheless, hard pressed government bureaucrats often lean heavily on 'facts' and 'figures' in measuring institutional performance. Moreover, the challenge nearly everywhere is to align performance measurement and the need for public accountability with the fundamental characteristics and core activities of higher education institutions. Performance data can be valuable aids to management, particularly under circumstance of rapid institutional change. But how best to approach the management of change in higher education is an ongoing challenge for institutional leaders and government bureaucrats everywhere.
Quality, and how the various stakeholders in higher education are to be assured of quality, has become a policy imperative on the higher education political agendas nearly everywhere. But, while it is generally recognised that institutions must be held accountable for the quality of their activities, there is no single, concise operational definition regarding this concept. According to Birnbaum (1989: 24):
Conflicting definitions suggest two aspects of the quality dilemma. The first dilemma is whether quality can or should be considered by either absolute or relativistic criteria. The second dilemma is that, regardless of the position taken, the various dimensions of quality often have structural or procedural requirements that are in conflict. For example, improving quality by making undergraduate instruction 'better' may require uses of faculty time, delivery system, administrative support and financial resources that would hinder improvements of quality in research or service. Decisions that improve the goodness of one of these desired outcomes frequently will result in costs for another outcome.
Theory can do little to resolve the dilemmas produced by the trade-offs inherent in the pursuit of quality, except to suggest that quality priorities and institutional missions should coincide. But, with regard to definitions of quality, there is strong support within the professional literature for a relativistic perspective. Quality is a relative concept: multidimensional, interpretive and contextually determined. Quality of higher education can only be defined in relation to a set of goals.
From this perspective, the concepts of quality and relevance converge. Quality relates to the degree to which an institution is fulfilling its goals, and relevance relates to the degree to which those goals are applicable to the needs and demands of society. Christopher Ball (1985: 100) makes a similar observation with respect to excellence and value:
We could say that the student who has been through an engineering course and achieved third class Honours was valuable to...industry, but that he had not achieved excellence on the course. Conversely, we might say that the student who followed a course in...English and achieved first class Honours was excellent at his course, but that he was less valuable to the society...
It is possible (and valuable as well) to assess the degree to which a higher education institution is achieving its stated mission, goals and aims, and also it is possible to assess the relevance of the institution to the needs of society. But if this is to occur, both the goals of the higher education institution and the needs of society must be operationalised in such a way that lend themselves to assessment. Also, there should be some correspondence between the goals of the institution and their relevance to society, otherwise it is possible to end up with quality institutions of little relevance, or vice versa. However, in that there is a variety of stakeholders with diverse and sometimes divergent views and interests involved in determining both the goals of the higher educational institutions and the needs of society, specification of goals and needs becomes problematic indeed.
Moreover, while it appears logical to have as much correspondence as possible between the goals of higher education institutions and their relevance to the needs of society, past efforts to achieve such correspondence with any precision have proved difficult (Neave and van Vught 1994: 264-316). But, given society's investment in higher education, quality and relevance must be assured.
The quality assurance movement is driven by many of the same paradigmatic shifts and ideologies underpinning changes in both institutional management and government steering of higher education. Managerialism and entrepreneurialism are replacing collegial governance at both the institutional and sector levels as governments increasingly rely on market-like mechanisms to ensure efficiency and effectiveness, value for money and substantially increased private sources of funding for public higher education. In a market-like entrepreneurial environment, the consumer rather than Academe takes precedence, and such notions as Total Quality Management become quite appealing to institutional leaders as they compete with other institutions for their market share of consumer support. Davies (1993: 121) observes that
the whole complex of these developments thus produces some movement away from the familiar pattern of collegialism and professional bureaucracy to the less well defined paradigms...of managerialism and entrepreneurialism, which fuse at many points, such as in conceptions of total quality management; customer care processes; models of institutional review and performance indicators themselves.
Lindsay (1992: 154) contrasts what he calls the 'stakeholder-judgment' as distinct from the 'production-measurement' view of quality. He goes on to say of the former that 'in this approach any equating of simple quantitative measures with quality is rejected and, instead, reliance is placed on a wide variety of measures and the overall judgments of interested parties'. It is informed judgement rather than reliance on quantitative measures that is most important in assessing educational quality. 'Allied to this view', according to Lindsay (1992: 155-156), 'is the concern that a pre-occupation with quantifying performance has distorted our conception of educational processes and outcomes at the expense of important but intangible dimensions which cannot be captured by performance indicators or assessments of effectiveness and efficiency'. In a similar vein, Yorke (1995: 52) argues that 'The closer one gets to teaching and learning the softer is the data on which one is obliged to call. And the softer the data, the greater the importance of cross-referencing it and of interpreting it with reference to the specific context in which it was gathered'.
Proxy indicators-such as student throughput or failure rates-can be used by management as a 'basis for asking questions about the department's success or otherwise in achieving a high level of quality' (Yorke 1995: 53). But according to Yorke (1995: 52), some features of quality '(notably teaching and learning) are not amenable to the production of data that are valid on a sectoral basis'. Thus:
It would seem sensible to construct a system in which data is reported 'upwards' only as far as its context can be meaningfully understood, with an analogue of quality assurance being used to satisfy superordinate levels that the evaluative process in respect of this softer data is being used in such a manner that confidence can be placed in the lower levels' own systems for accountability.
Of particular importance is to determine how quality measures at one level can relate to and generate confidence in their reliability at other levels, and thereby build confidence in the overall quality assurance system. But in many countries, the quality assurance movement has produced a 'crises of confidence' at all levels: departmental, institutional, and sectoral. This seems to occur when quality assurance, like other accountability measures, have been imposed top-down. Governments have at once devolved more responsibility to institutions while at the same time maintained tight control over them through various accountability frameworks. It is as if governments do not trust institutions to responsibly exercise the freedoms that they have been provided.
A similar situation seems to be reproducing itself within the institutions themselves, as Watkins (1993: 9) notes: 'Policy making and planning have become more highly centralised with the senior academic/manager taking on the language of "efficiency", "productivity", "quality assurance and management", "profitability" and "accountability" espoused by their counterparts in the business world'. But the centralisation of control 'has been combined with a decentralisation where financial responsibility, industrial relations, staffing and marketing the academic product has been pushed down the line to the operating units of the department or schools'.
The day to day management responsibilities are decentralised while central management maintains relatively close control through the planning and monitoring processes. Such commentators as Watkins (1993), Langford (1991) and Buchbinder and Newson (1992) see this as the application of commercial quality assurance management practices to higher education institutions which in turn creates a number of tensions between academic staff and management. Clearly, Australia has not avoided these tensions or the clash of norms, values and cultures embedded within them. In Australia as elsewhere, as Moses (1995:12-13) argues:
Most academic staff still do not relate to concepts like performance indicators, quality assurance, total quality management, international standards, stakeholder, customer or client, input and output. The quality movement has built a superstructure of concepts and jargon which is derived from business and industry and dismissed by academic staff as such. University administrators and managers have neglected to translate these concepts into concepts which can be integrated into academics' value system. As there is no shared discourse, the very legitimate attempts to make academic staff more accountable towards their students, towards each other, the institution and the public are discredited.
The quality movement in Australia is quite recent. The 1991 publication of the then Minster for Higher Education's (the Hon. Peter Baldwin) report: Higher Education: Quality and Diversity in the 1990s and the subsequent establishment of the Committee for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (CQAHE) in 1993 - independent from but reporting to government - were the first real indicators of government concern in this area. The Committee's guidelines clearly conveyed the principle that quality assurance should be based on a reward system tied to the achievement of excellence.
Quality assurance was to be ascertained by 'locating' universities along two axes of measurement: first, in relation to their development of internal systems of performance review; and second, in relation to their excellence, as evidenced largely by external measures, such as research productivity. In comparison to other countries, the Australian approach was unique in that it rewarded institutions which could demonstrate both excellent quality assurance procedures and outcomes (Moses 1995).
CQAHE conducted its first quality review in 1993, inviting institutions to submit quality assurance portfolios that were then assessed by review panels whose membership was drawn from both the higher education sector and industry. Institutional participation in the quality review was voluntary but, not surprisingly, given that the rankings attached additional financial income, all universities chose to participate. Results were reported in March 1994 (CQAHE 1994). Institutions were divided into six groups. Group 1 institutions were assessed as having excellent outcomes in research, teaching and learning and community services; well-developed planning processes which support the quality assurance processes; and evidence of international as well as national referencing. They received 3 per cent of their operating grant as reward money. Group 5 institutions received 1 per cent of their operating grant for having sound outcomes in focused areas but less well-developed processes; or improving outcomes supported by generally sound processes. The eight institutions in Group 6 shared (though not equally) the final $2.7m. of the quality money. The older research universities dominated the two top quality assurance rankings.
The Committee repeated the exercise in 1994 (CQAHE 1995a) (focusing on teaching) and 1995 (CQAHE 1995b) (focusing on research and community service). The 1994 results (reported in February 1995) were similar to those of 1993, though this time institutions were placed in only three groups (what some commentators regarded as excellent, good and poor). In reporting the 1995 results, the Committee adopted a more complicated classificatory scheme, but nonetheless, as was the case in 1993 and 1994, the older research universities won most of the available quality assurance money. The Committee was discontinued after its 1995 review.
During its three years of operation the Committee's quality reviews have had various consequences for higher education, not the least of which is a good deal of institutional imitation in terms of quality procedures and practices. Following completion of the 1993 review, the practice of institutions reading other institutions' quality assurance portfolios became widespread and certainly generated a pressure, particularly on the lower ranked institutions, to emulate the 'best practices' of those institutions that were placed at the top of the ranking. Institutions borrowed quality assurance policies from other institutions, employed consultants to help them prepare for the next two quality review rounds, and established quality assurance offices in one form or another.
The position of Pro Vice-Chancellor quality has proliferated within the system. Although the Higher Education Council report that led to the establishment of the the Committee for Quality Assurance in Higher Education argued that the universities should determine their own definitions of 'quality', in developing quality procedures and practices, institutions have danced in unison more to the tune of the Committee than followed their own inclinations. The Committee's ranking of universities may have produced a semi-formal status differentiation within the sector, but overall competition amongst institutions to be ranked first has been a force for uniformity, at least in terms of quality assurance procedures and practices. At issue in Australia and elsewhere is how to establish uniform and system-wide quality assurance and other accountability procedures while at the same time maintaining/encouraging institutional diversity.
The Committee's lasting effects, detrimental or otherwise, remain to be established. On the positive side, it needs to be recognised that the Committee focused the higher education sector on quality and its assessment to a degree never before experienced in Australian higher education, and it is doubtful that this could have been accomplished in such a short period of time in the absence of a reward mechanism. Though it is unclear what quality assurance/performance mechanism will replace the CQAHE in the future, it is certain that government will continue to press for performance measurement of higher education in the name of public accountability. The challenge for the Australian higher education system is for the sector (and individual institutions) to take control of quality and its measurement, rather than leaving the initiative to government.
Much has been written about the management of quality in higher education, and the internal quality management practices of Australian universities was extensively reviewed by Piper (1993). Experience in Australia and elsewhere demonstrates that the management of quality is both a complicated and delicate task, and one that requires the commitment of academic staff. An externally imposed bureaucratic approach to quality assurance does not seem to work well and may be counter productive in terms of the benefits to be derived from de-regulation and institutional self-management. Possibly, this is an opportune time for Australian universities to both exercise self-management with respect to quality assurance and set in place mechanisms where institutions are seen to be regularly monitoring quality. The Netherlands is a good example of where the university sector itself controls quality assurance, at least in part, while at the same time satisfying government and the community that quality issues are being addressed.
In accordance with government desire to give higher education institutions more autonomy and the opportunity to set their own direction, during the 1980s the Netherlands developed a quality control system that is basically run by the two sectors themselves (universities and HBO (polytechnics)). With respect to the universities, the quality assurance exercise in the Netherlands is run by the Association of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU, the Dutch equivalent to the AVCC) and is informative and improvement oriented, based on institutional self-evaluation and peer review (see Dochy et al. 1990; Goedegebuure et al. 1990). The VSNU organises committees of experts to visit departments offering the same course program. The committees publish their reports, but 'the aim of the exercise is not ranking or rating but accountability and improvement' (Vroeljenstijn 1966: 13). Poorly performing departments are given time for improvement and there is no direct link between assessment and funding, though after a subsequent visitation where a committee assesses that the situation for a poorly performing department has not changed, the government may consider withdrawing funding.
The above is not intended to advocate the wholesale adoption of the Dutch approach to quality assurance in Australia. Rather, the main point is, as Vroeljenstijn concludes with respect to the Dutch approach to quality assurance, 'A system owned by the institutions themselves and directed towards improvement is bound to last longer than a system handled by an external body and which aims at inspection and control'.
It is at the program level (department, school, etc.) where the basic activities of higher education take place: teaching, research and community service. A fundamental aspect of most higher education institutions, particularly universities, is the very high degree of both disciplinary diversity and disciplinary insulation that they contain (Clark 1983). A university is a collection of different and distinct disciplinary cultures (Becher 1989), which according to many students of higher education is what makes universities unique from other types of organisations.
There is one school of thought that considers management principles as universal: good management practice can be transferred from organisation to organisation despite the line of business of a particular organisation. Coupled with this is the belief that large organisations require corporate style management, strong leadership, and clear lines of authority. According to Scott (1993: 47) 'the 'collegial' university governed by the academic guild assisted by low-profile administrators has been succeeded by the "managerial" university dominated by an increasingly expert cadre of senior managers' which, according to him is caused in particular by the size of the present day institutions. 'Universities must be managed as businesses not because they are businesses but because they are on a corporate scale' (Scott 1993).
A contrary argument points to the unique features of higher education institutions as making a corporate style of management not only difficult but inadvisable. Indeed, there are numerous assertions that since the ultimate goal of higher education institutions is the creation, preservation and transmission of knowledge, they cannot be managed like private corporations. According to this view higher education governance rests ultimately on collegial consensus rather than on executive priority. Academics rather than 'managers' know best how to run the university and must be given the freedom and autonomy to pursue knowledge wherever it may lead them.
The 'special' nature of higher education argument does not stand the test of reality, and the collegial model of academic governance probably has always been a well perpetuated myth. Nonetheless, higher education institutions do have their own particular norms and values that must be taken into account in devising effective management structures and practices (cf. Ashby 1966; Clark 1983). As with society in general, academic norms and values often are more potent in their violation than in their day-to-day conformation. Moreover, much of the general literature on management of change argues for a degree of congruence between policy goals and the values of those who are to implement them.
A number of commentators argue that success in terms of actual change is more likely if there exists congruence between the intended changes and the basic characteristics of the organisations at which change is directed (Becher and Kogan 1980; Clark 1983; Hage and Aiken 1970; Henkel 1988; Levine 1980). With regard to higher education, this implies that the prevailing norms and values of academia play a crucial part in the successful adoption of change. In this respect, the fact that higher education institutions are often presumed to be unresponsive to change has to be related to higher education's specific structure of high professional autonomy and diffused and fragmented decision-making structure. It is not so much that change does not occur, it is rather that change occurs predominantly at the 'grass-roots level', instead of at the overall institutional level, thus making change less observable to the outsider (Clark 1983; Kerr 1982).
With respect to the characteristics of the intended or proposed changes themselves, there is some compelling evidence to suggest that these play a crucial part in the successful adoption of change within organisations (Cerych and Sabatier 1986; Levine 1980; Rogers 1983; Rogers and Schoemaker 1971). The most important variable is the profitability of the proposed change to the organisation. In other words, the relative advantage of the change should be clear to those whose work is to be affected.
The mere scale on which many higher education institutions now operate necessitates strong and professional management. But as stated above, it appears that change cannot be effectively forced on higher education institutions in the absence of due appreciation of basic academic norms and values, either by government or by institutional executives. To bring about enduring change in higher education, governments require the support of institutions, and institutions require the active support and commitment of the academic communities which they embrace. To do otherwise generates wide spread staff alienation and disenchantment:
[One] ...reason for academic staffs' alienation is the managerial approach to change. In response to government, institutions have adopted a management style borrowed from industry and have largely replaced the collegial model of decision making with a managerial one. A loose accountability arrangement has been replaced by clear line-management responsibilities of deans and heads for programs, staffing, and the largely devolved budget. All universities still operate within the academic sphere in largely a collegial way, but in resource allocation and many other areas of decision making collegial input, if sought at all, is advice only.
(Moses 1995: 13)
Moses acknowledges that change was necessary, but the way in which it has been introduced has alienated academic staff and in the process made the changes themselves, such as quality assessment, more cosmetic than substantive.
This chapter has reviewed what appear to be universal trends in the transformation of higher education systems and institutions. Nearly everywhere, change in higher education has been both rapid and often dramatic, not only placing pressure on institutional management, but in many instances transforming it.
The pressures, however, are not all moving in the same direction or intended to produce the same outcomes. Indeed, some of these carry the unintended consequence of sending contradictory messages to those charged with higher education management. For example, increasing demands placed on management through quality assurance and other accountability measures appear to be undermining the anticipated benefits of a more deregulated and competitive higher education system. Diversity is one clear example of where diametrically opposed pressures undermines policy intention. While institutions may wish to fill a perceived market niche the reward system and accountability demands make this more difficult to achieve.
Even in the private commercial sector, there is no such thing as a totally free 'market', unfettered by government regulation. Nonetheless, many higher education policies employ the metaphor of the market, and in many countries there has been a deliberate attempt to introduce more market-like forms of competition into higher education. But few if any countries are prepared to create 'true' higher education markets, through, for example, privatising all higher education institutions or abolishing direct institutional grants in favour of student voucher systems.
In Australia, for example, despite the market system rhetoric and hype used in relation to higher education, it is questionable whether any federal government would allow any institution which consistently under performed to go bankrupt, as would be expected in a true market system. Apart from the division of legislative and financial responsibilities for Australian higher education institutions, it is important not to underestimate the political context whereby every institution belongs to one or more State/federal politicians' electorate. Government accountability for the tax payer dollar is very much a mediated function.
Despite the limitations of creating quasi market like conditions, and the brake which an over emphasis on accountability places on market like responses, it is most likely that the management of higher education will continue to be influenced by reforms that drive higher education institutions and systems towards competition and the adoption of corporate style management paradigms. The impact of these trends on Australian higher education management is examined in more detail in the following chapter.