CHAPTER 7: OUTCOMES, FEES AND INCENTIVES
This chapter describes the general principles which will govern payment
arrangements in the employment placement market and suggests an indicative
set of fee structures which might be used in the first round of market tenders.
The labour market assistance reforms announced in this Statement will radically
change the way that jobseekers are helped into jobs. To support these reforms,
it is essential that payment arrangements provide incentives for EPEs to
get real jobs for unemployed people.
An important requirement under the new competitive framework will be to
move to pricebased tendering as soon as possible. The provision of services
through a pricebased tendering model will help to ensure that the market
is truly competitive and that taxpayers get value for money.
The Government believes that it should be possible to move quickly to implement
pricebased tendering for labour exchange services under the arrangements
outlined in Chapter 5. For intensive employment assistance, however, an immediate introduction
of pricebased tendering could undermine a smooth transition to the new
market arrangements, given the tighter definition of 'outcome' now proposed
and uncertainties about the precise levels of assistance needed to generate
a given level of outcomes. For this reason the Government is prepared to
consider the use of a fixedfee schedule for the first round of tenders
in the market, and has developed an indicative fee structure for this purpose.
It proposes that this issue should be open to further discussion as part
of the forthcoming public consultation process.
A framework for fees in the employment placement market payment
Payment arrangements need to provide clear incentives for EPEs to place
clients into real jobs. These incentives can be built into payment schedules
in a number of ways.
Outcome payments
Payments to EPEs will be weighted towards outcome payments. This means EPEs
will get most of their payment after a jobseeker has got a job and kept
it.
However, subject to suitable financial safeguards and quality assurance arrangements, there will also be scope for paying upfront fees to EPEs. These will be paid after a jobseeker has been referred to an EPE. The provision of upfront fees recognises that some organisations will need a measure of funding at the outset so that they have sufficient cash to maintain operations and help jobseekers until they get an outcome. Upfront fees will be limited to a defined proportion (no more than 30 per cent) of total payments.
Outcomes
Chapter 3 defined the two forms of outcomes which will qualify for payments
in the employment placement market:
As discussed in Chapter 3, EPEs will generally be paid a higher fee for
achieving a primary outcome than a secondary outcome.
To be counted as an outcome, jobs or training places will need to substantially
reduce or end a jobseeker's allowance or benefit for at least six months.
For the first time, under these arrangements, labour market assistance will
incorporate real incentives to get people into jobs.
An outcome period of six months will ensure that the employment placement
market focuses on permanent jobs. It will also provide the best chance for
the jobseeker to become genuinely attached to the labour market. A real
job or training placement for at least six months will substantially enhance
the future labour market competitiveness of the jobseeker. Put simply, a
significantly shorter period than this would result in little more than
queue shuffling.
Secondary outcomes may better suit the needs of some jobseekers, such as
youth, sole parents and people with disabilities. In these cases, such secondary
outcomes could qualify for payment at the primary outcome rate. Other groups
may also need to be considered in this context.
Under the current case management arrangements, a parttime employment outcome
requires an average of at least 20 hours of work per week over 13 weeks.
The corresponding definition to be used in the employment placement market
should be discussed in the public consultation process.
Level of need
Some jobseekers need more assistance than others, and payment levels should
recognise these different levels of need. This is particularly important
for any transitional fee structure. To be effective, a payment system needs
to:
Retention of unspent funds
When LMP funds are cashed out, EPEs will spend their money on providing
or buying services to help jobseekers. EPEs will be funded to help a specific
number of jobseekers into jobs. At times, they will have to spend more on
a jobseeker than the funds coming with that jobseeker while at other times,
they will spend less.
EPEs will be able to keep any payments not spent on assisting a jobseeker.
The operation of price competition will ensure that these payments are kept
to moderate levels. Although it could be argued that funds not spent on
assisting a particular client should be returned, this would be inconsistent
with a flexible, outcomefocused approach. It would also ignore the fact
that for some jobseekers, EPEs may need to spend more than they receive.
As outcome payments will form the larger part of EPE payments and will be
paid in full only after a jobseeker has held an outcome for at least six
months, there is minimal risk that EPEs will under-service jobseekers.
The Government will not implement a system requiring EPEs to report expenditure
incurred on each individual jobseeker. This would be a waste of the Government's
and EPEs' time and energy and would not add any value. Instead, EPEs will
be accountable through their contracts for their performance against the
outcomes they have committed themselves to deliver.
Advance payments
Some community and not-for-profit EPEs may be able to apply for advanced
payments to meet establishment costs. Whereas upfront fees would not be
recoverable, advance payments would need to be repaid. Interested organisations
may wish to comment in the consultation process on the level of advances
needed to meet setup costs. Repayment arrangements also need to be considered.
EPEs not requiring advance payments will be given preferential treatment
in the tendering process. This means that, all other things being equal,
an organisation not requesting advance funding would be more likely to win
a contract than one which sought such funding.
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Moving towards a pricebased tender
A pricebased tendering model for intensive employment assistance will be
introduced as soon as possible. This will allow the employment placement
market to set the true cost of obtaining real outcomes for jobseekers. As
noted above, however, it may be desirable to use a fixedfee schedule in
the first round of tenders in the market. This issue will be discussed further
in the public consultation process.
Possible arrangements for the first tender round
This section examines an indicative fee structure which might be used in the first round of tenders if it were decided not to move immediately to full price competition. The final shape of any such fee structure would be determined after detailed community consultation and further analysis.
An indicative fee structure
For illustrative purposes only, Table 7.1 provides an example of a possible fixedfee structure for intensive employment
assistance. Under this model, it is assumed that an EPE obtaining an outcome
for a jobseeker would be eligible for three payments:
A higher payment would be made for a fulltime job (including apprenticeships
and traineeships) and a lower payment for accredited education or training
places or a parttime employment outcome. EPEs not successful in securing
a jobseeker an outcome would receive the upfront payment only. In the following
illustration, EPEs receive:
Table 7.1: An indicative fixedfee structure for intensive employment assistance
|
Client category(1) |
Upfront service fee (30%)(2) |
Primary outcome payment after 13 weeks (40%) |
Secondary outcome payment after 13 weeks |
Primary outcome payment after 26 weeks (30%) |
Secondary outcome payment after 26 weeks |
Total payment (primary outcome) |
Total payment (secondary outcome) |
1 | $1,500 | $2,000 | $500 | $1,500 | $500 | $5,000 | $2,500 |
|
2 | $2,250 | $3,000 | $500 | $2,250 | $500 | $7,500 | $3,250 |
|
3 | $3,000 | $4,000 | $500 | $3,000 | $500 | $10,000 | $4,000 |
(1) Jobseekers eligible for intensive employment assistance as discussed in Chapter 6:
Category 1: jobseekers who are newly unemployed but at high risk of longterm unemployment, and longterm unemployed clients with less serious forms of disadvantage;
Category 2: more seriously disadvantaged longterm unemployed jobseekers; and
Category 3: persons with disabilities and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander clients who confront multiple barriers to employment.
(2) Initial fee paid on referral to EPE.
Under the indicative model described above, and on certain assumptions about
the proportions of outcomes achieved, the average payment per client under
this fee structure is estimated at $3,250. This estimated average is lower
than the maximum amount payable for assisting EPE clients, as it would be
unrealistic to expect that all clients will be able to get a job. Consistent
with the general principles discussed above, the payments in this model
vary according to different levels of jobseeker need. Final details of a
transitional payment structure, if adopted, will be settled at the end of
the public consultation process.
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Issues for public consultation
Prospective EPEs and other interested groups may wish to consider the following
issues relating to fees, outcomes and incentives in the employment placement
market.
CHAPTER 8: THE ROLE OF A COMMONWEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY AGENCY
A new agency for the integrated delivery of Commonwealth services will be
established within the Social Security portfolio. It will become the delivery
agency for all DSS services and a number of DEETYA services to jobseekers,
students and youth. The agency will operate under a system of service agreements
with relevant Commonwealth policy Departments. DSS will become the income
support policy department and DEETYA the policy department for employment,
education, training, student and youth affairs.
It is expected that the agency will add to its initial range of functions
over time and become a onestopshop for a wide range of Government services.
For example, from the beginning of 1998, child care payments will be paid
by the agency and families will have to deal only with the new agency, rather
than the three separate agencies involved currently. The new agency will
be responsible for the expenditure of approximately 30 per cent of total
Commonwealth budget outlays.
The establishment of this agency will mark a major change in service delivery
arrangements for the Commonwealth. Even in the shorter term its income support
and related employment services will extend across families, the unemployed,
students, retired persons, carers and widows, the shortterm incapacitated
and people with disabilities. It will therefore be the public presence for
some of the most important social responsibilities of Government. The new
agency offers a great opportunity to improve and re-focus customer services
and to build on recent efforts to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of public services. It will take advantage of economies of scale, eliminate
duplication of services and improve accountability.
Innovation will be encouraged, with scope for the re-engineering of traditional
processes. Teleservicing, for example, offers significant potential for
service improvement and efficiency savings, and the new agency will make
widespread use of this and related electronic communication strategies.
A new network of touchscreens will enable clients to access all jobs registered
on the national vacancy database and to obtain information on Government
programmes.
The agency will aim to apply world's best practice in the delivery of Government
services to clients. It will improve the quality and consistency of services,
enhance the access of unemployed people to active participation in the labour
market and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Commonwealth service
delivery overall.
The Departments with which the agency deals will focus on policy development
and programme design as their core roles, contracting the delivery of services
to the agency. Although policy Departments and the agency will be independent
of each other, very close linkages will be achieved particularly through
membership of the Secretaries of DEETYA and DSS on the agency board.
Governance
The agency will be established under statute within the Social Security
portfolio and be responsible to the Minister for Social Security. It will
make decisions about the best way to deliver services and be fully accountable
through the normal parliamentary mechanisms.
The Government will introduce legislation which will enable the Minister
for Social Security to appoint an executive board. The board will then appoint
a Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The CEO will be responsible for managing
the daytoday functions of the agency, ensuring that the outcomes specified
in service agreements with client departments are met. The board will comprise
a Chairperson and at least two other voting members. The Secretaries of
DSS and DEETYA will be nonvoting members of the board. Interim arrangements
will be put in place pending the passage of legislation.
The agency will provide better services to customers. Specifically it will:
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As noted above, the new agency will assume responsibility for the delivery
of all DSS services, a range of DEETYA services to jobseekers, students
and youth, and the delivery of certain child care payments to families.
This range of responsibilities could expand over time to incorporate additional
service delivery functions currently performed by other Commonwealth portfolios.
Functions relating to employment assistance
The agency's role in labour market assistance services to unemployed people
will involve:
The agency will also provide a range of specialist services to facilitate
access to labour market assistance by disadvantaged groups, eg, sole parents,
people with disabilities, Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders and young
people.
Registration
The agency will register and assess new applicants for income support and
unemployment assistance. This will remove inefficiencies in the dual registration
processes currently used by DSS and DEETYA for unemployment assistance.
Self-help services
As outlined in Chapter 4, the agency will provide selfhelp job search services
to anyone looking for work, including those who do not qualify for income
support. These services will include on-line access to a national vacancy
database and other selfhelp services, as listed in Chapter 4.
Referral to employment assistance by EPEs
The agency will refer to EPEs those clients selected for intensive employment
assistance. As discussed in Chapter 6, this will include people on unemployment allowances who are considered
to be at risk of long-term unemployment and recipients of other income support
payments who are assessed as in need and likely to benefit from IEA. Young
people aged 1520 who do not receive income support but are at risk of long-term
unemployment may also qualify for intensive assistance. The Jobseeker Classification
Instrument will be used to identify those at risk of longterm unemployment.
Where jobseekers are eligible for intensive employment assistance the agency
would assess their capacity to benefit from such assistance. It would also
select jobseekers for referral to EPEs in accordance with the arrangements
described in Chapter 6, and within guidelines specified in its service agreement
with DEETYA. Income support recipients such as JET clients and people with
disabilities would continue to have their needs assessed under separate
criteria developed in consultation with key stakeholders. These assessments
would be undertaken by specialist staff located within the agency.
The agency will also refer eligible jobseekers to the other forms of assistance
described in Chapter 4, namely labour exchange services and additional job search assistance services
for those unemployed beyond a certain defined period. In some cases also,
as part of its responsibilities for activity testing and compliance (see
below), the agency may require a jobseeker to follow up vacancies registered
on the national vacancy database.
The agency will deliver specialist services to the following groups of clients:
The principles guiding the proposed arrangements for specialist services
are that:
Disability services
Disability support officers will be located in agency outlets. They will
be responsible for assessing the extent and nature of clients' disabilities
and their need for employment assistance or related services. They will
be a point of referral for clients to service providers. They will also
play a key role in the determination of clients' entitlements to disability
related payments.
Services for youth
In the interests of a coherent approach to youth servicing, the agency will
be the primary means of delivering assessment, referral and income support
services for young people. In addition to performing mainstream youth servicing
functions currently undertaken through the CES and DSS networks, it will
integrate the functions of specialist youth and student services including
Student Assistance Centres (SACs), Youth Access Centres (YACs) and Youth
Servicing Units (YSUs). This coordinated service for young people will
include information on the full range of services available from government
and community agencies.
The agency will refer young people to the most appropriate providers of
specialist services, whether they be employment placement enterprises, education
and training institutions or community welfare agencies. For those young
people aged less than 18 in particular it will need to be sensitive to the
importance of education and training to effective skill development and
future labour market prospects.
The agency will be a major point of contact with young people and serve
as an 'early detection' point for young people at risk of homelessness,
abuse and longterm unemployment. It will provide referrals and contact
points for other youth service providers, particularly those targeted to
homeless and atrisk young people.
The agency will also be responsible for acceptance and assessment of claims for student assistance and associated payment processing.
People receiving unemployment allowances are required to comply with the
conditions of the activity test (demonstrating active job search and willingness
to take up available employment). They are also required to comply with
the more general notification requirements applying to all income support
recipients. A key requirement placed on unemployment allowees is to report
all significant changes in their employment circumstances. Other events
affecting qualification or payment include receipt of income or assets,
changes to marital status, imprisonment or engaging in activities which
are inconsistent with availability for employment.
The agency will have prime responsibility for the administration of the
activity test and other compliance measures within guidelines agreed with
the Department of Social Security, which will have policy responsibility
for such matters.
It is expected that existing measures which check or enforce compliance
with general notification requirements (eg, verification of income and assets)
would not be affected by the establishment of the new agency. However, the
integration into the agency of current CES and DSS functions relating to
unemployment allowances will provide opportunities to resolve confusion
in roles and responsibilities for activity test issues, reduce doublehandling
and better integrate information about the job search behaviour of individual
jobseekers.
Current DSS procedures for monitoring compliance with the requirement to
undertake active job search rely on the successful completion of administrative
requirements (eg, reporting job search efforts fortnightly or keeping a
record of job search activities) but job search activity can only be verified
by imposing additional administrative requirements on employers. The availability
of vacancy data, referral to employment assistance and links between the
agency and EPEs should improve the quality of activity testing while avoiding
additional administration. There will also be scope to build on promising
developments in information technology such as the new network of touchscreen
terminals by including an electronic log of job search activities.
The agency will work closely with EPEs on activity testing and compliance
issues. As noted in Chapter 6, EPEs will be required to report to the agency
any breach of activity test requirements identified through their employment
placement activities. Where jobseekers are receiving intensive employment
assistance through an EPE, that EPE will be responsible for monitoring compliance
with the activity test requirements. EPEs will be in the best position to
monitor the jobseeker's activities and determine if individual jobseekers
are breaching their requirements. This approach will also eliminate the
duplication of responsibility associated with current arrangements for case
managed clients.
Activity test requirements for longterm unemployed jobseekers not selected for intensive assistance will be more flexible, with some being given the option of either meeting standard job search requirements (as described above) or participating in alternative activities which contribute to improving jobreadiness, help to overcome barriers to employment or contribute to the community. Activities could include participation in voluntary work, community development activities, community education or other activities suggested by the jobseeker subject to approval by the agency.
Planning for the implementation of the new agency will begin immediately.
The period to December 1996 will concentrate on information and consultation
processes, the development of legislation and the reengineering of processes
to integrate income support and employment services. The next stage of implementation
will involve the identification of jobs and staff for the agency, an intensive
programme of staff training and the installation of touchscreen facilities
in the agency's offices.
The agency is expected to be formally established in July 1997. It will progressively assume its new responsibilities over the period JulySeptember 1997, and is expected to be fully operational by December 1997. Overall there will be a strong focus on ensuring a smooth transition to the new arrangements for staff, customers and the community.
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